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The Blockade, Islamism and Intra-Sect Tensions: Explaining Saudi-Qatari Tensions 
 
Introduction:  
On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain Egypt and the United Arab Emirates severed 
diplomatic ties with Qatar, citing Doha’s support for “various terrorist and sectarian groups 
aimed at destabilizing the region including the Muslim Brotherhood, Daesh (ISIS) and Al- 
Qaeda”1, and for supporting the “activities of Iranian-backed terrorist groups” across the 
Middle East. The years that followed were shaped by much hostility, with calls from Saudi 
officials to dig a canal between the two states – with part of the canal reserved for a nuclear 
waste facility - cutting Qatar off from the Arabian Peninsula and its only land border in the 
process. While support for Iran is often cited as the source of this tension, in this interven-
tion we argue that tensions do not emerge from Qatari support for Iran but rather, from 
competing visions of the role of Islam within the construction of regional order in what we 
view as a form of intra-Sunni sectarianism. Indeed, as Saudi Arabia and Qatar sought to ex-
ert influence on regional politics, their contrasting positions over the role of (political) Islam-
ism(s)2 as an ordering principle within domestic and regional politics became a source of 
friction between the two states.  
Before we proceed further, a brief interjection is necessary regarding our under-
standing of sectarianism. While a vast literature exists exploring sectarian tensions, this typ-
ically focuses on inter-sect, Sunni-Shi’a tensions and understanding the ways in which par-
ticular identities exist within – and occasionally across – political projects; Yet as Valbjorn 
                                                          
1 No Author, “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Severs Diplomatic and Consular Relations With Qatar 2 Jeddah”,  Saudi Press Agency, June 5, 
2017, https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637321#1637321. 
2 We reject the notion that there is one form of political Islam, following the ideas of Shahab Ahmed and others; see Ahmed, Shahab. What 
Is Islam? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).  
2 
 
and others have observed, to limit the line of inquiry to inter-sectarian tensions risks missing 
a great deal.3 
The focus on intra-sectarian tensions within Sunni or Shi’a branches of Islam – or in-
deed, within different schools of thought within those branches – views sectarianism as the 
religiously charged deviation away from a collective whole. Thus, analysis of intra-sectarian 
tensions necessitates a slightly different approach, requiring a focus on the ways in which 
boundaries between different communities are drawn. In this vein, we follow the position 
advocated by Mabon and Ardovini who take sectarianism to be a process of exclusion and 
othering, a process of boundary making from within a shared community - defined broadly -
and conditioned by the peculiarities of time and space.4 Following such a definition, while 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar are ostensibly members of the same faith community, deviation 
from that community and the propagation of  different visions of order amidst competing 
visions of the role of religion in political life has created a schism which was deepened 
through processes of boundary making.  
These differences have manifested in increasingly fractious relations between Riyadh 
and Doha which has played out across regional politics as Saudi Arabia and Qatar seek to 
cultivate relations with particular groups across the region. In particular, this has provoked 
support for rival factions within Syria’s civil war and the adoption of contrasting views about 
political Islamist groups. From this, we can see Saudi Arabia and Qatar engaging processes of 
othering and boundary making within and across regional politics, in pursuit of regime in-
terest and survival. Although coming to the fore after the events of the Arab Uprisings, we 
                                                          
3 See the work of Morten Valbjorn, Fanar Haddad, Helle Malmvig, Tamirace Fakhoury, Toby Dodge, John Nagle, Mona Harb and others  
4 Mabon, Simon and ; Lucia Ardovini,  “People, sects and states: interrogating sectarianism in the contemporary Middle East, Global 
Discourse” (6:4, 2016) 551_560 (p. 552). 
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argue that the roots of these tensions run far deeper and can be traced back to processes of 
state formation, legitimation and the position of clerics within both states.  
Saudi-Qatari Tensions: State Formation, Sectarianism and Geopolitics  
Although the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has dominated analysis of re-
gional politics in recent years5, tension between Saudi Arabia and Qatar has become in-
creasingly prominent in recent years, albeit with deep historical roots.6 The 2017 withdraw-
al of ambassadors and ensuing blockade came only three years after Saudi, Emirati, Bahraini 
and Egyptian ambassadors were withdrawn from Qatar, ostensibly for not implementing a 
“non-interference” security pact concerned with domestic politics. While the 2014 crisis was 
ultimately resolved, the 2017 crisis was far more serious, prompting the publication of 13 
demands including the closure of Al Jazeera which many viewed as an effort to erode Qatari 
sovereignty.  
Such concerns have deep roots, dating back to the formation of the modern Saudi 
state. In the 1930s, King Abd al- Aziz al-Saud of Saudi Arabia “informed the ruler of Qatar 
that those living on the Qatari peninsula were his subjects and part of his dirah (territory to 
which tribal rights of control are claimed)”7. The disparity of power between Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar evident in Ibn Saud’s remarks continued to be felt in the coming decades, shaping 
relations between the two states. For many Qataris, the blockade was another effort to “to 
impose guardianship on the state” and related the menace to a deliberate “violation of its 
(Qatar's) sovereignty as a state”.8  
                                                          
5 See Simon Mabon, Banafsheh Keynoush, Lawrence Rubin, Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Robert Mason and others. 
6 Ulrichsen,  Kristian C. “Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, September 24, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/24/qatar-and-arab-spring-policy-drivers-and-regional-implications. 
7 Baskan, Birol, and Steven Wright “Seeds of Change: Comparing State-Religion Relations in Qatar and Saudi Arabia,” Arab Studies 
Quarterly (33, no. 2:  2011): 96_111 (p. 108). 




Shared Wahhabi values played into such fears. Birol Baskan and Steven Wright sug-
gest that Wahhabism serves as a “potential political curb” on the relative autonomy  that 
rulers of Qatar enjoy.9 For Baskan and Wright, if the Ulama in Qatar held too much power 
they could conceivably align themselves with the Saudi state and thus pose a challenge to 
the sovereignty and stability of the Al Thani.10 The threats are compounded as Wahhabi 
links with Saudi Arabia intersect with intertribal and cross-border connections consolidated 
with intermarriage and regular transfer of people and ideas. 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia adhere to the Wahhabi sect of Islam, part of the Hanbali 
school of Islamic jurisprudence11 which is commonly considered as the strictest in terms of 
interpretation.12 Yet despite this similarity, both countries differ in the way they operation-
alize or integrate this Wahhabi brand of Islam within the internal dynamics of rule. Saudi 
Arabia’s Wahhabism is historically institutionalized as the foundation of the kingdom is 
based on the alliance between Mohamed Ibn Abdel-Wahab and Mohamed Ibn al-Saud in 
the 18th century, an exchange of oath under which the former found a “sword” to imple-
ment his radical views and the latter found a “religious banner” in order to unite the hither-
to fragmented or hostile Arab tribes under his command.13 This close relationship forged 
between a religious group and a political leadership has led to the development of a class of 
religious scholars with an institutionalized power and role in political decision-making. This 
is perhaps most evident in the need for political elites to secure religious approval for their 
decisions via bodies such as the office of the Grand Mufti, replaced by the Board of Senior 
                                                          
9 Baskan, Birol and Wright, , “Seeds of Change”, p. 108. 
10 Ibid., p. 96 
11 Hannabalism is one of the four approaches to Sunni Islam, called schools, and it is marked with its strict traditionalism depending on 
textualist interpretations of Quraan and a focus on dogmatic adoption of specific rites; see Makdisi, George “Hanbalite Islam”, in Studies on 
Islam, trans. and ed. Merlin L. Swartz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
12 Freer, Courtney, “Mapping Religious Authority in Wahhabi States: An Examination of Qatar and Saudi Arabia,” Rice University’s Baker 
Institute for Public Policy (March 2019), 1_20 (p.3). 




Religious Scholars in1971.14 The clergy even shared key components of the state-running 
activities including the legitimate use of force with the foundation of religious police force, 
mutawa’, charged with scrutinizing and enforcing morality in public.  
In contrast, Qatari state formation was not based on any such alliance with religious 
scholars but rather came out of the tribal contestations and compromises between Al-
Khalifa and Al-Thani. The latter consolidated their claims to power as they led a rebellion 
against the rule of the former in 1867 and as they also secured the recognition of the British 
Protectorate controlling the region with the demise of the Ottoman Empire. The ruling elites 
claim their origin from the Arabian Peninsula’s Nejd, the centre and northern part of Saudi 
Arabia where the Wahhabis first came from. However, this connection with Wahhabism is 
more figurative and constructed enough that the descendants of Mohamed Ibn Abdel-
Wahhab have denied or contested this linkage15. Furthermore, Qatar did not have an indig-
enous class of Ulema. Some scholars argue that this class has a more “secular character 
more comparable to Turkey than Saudi Arabia”.16 Yet Wahhabism retains a legitimising 
component seen in the decision to name one of Qatar’s biggest mosques after Mohamed 
Ibn Abdel-Wahab in what was a deeply unpopular move in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, descend-
ants of Abdel-Wahab living in the Kingdom asked the Qatari emir to change the name of the 
mosque ‘for it does not carry its true Salafi path’ shortly before Saudi Arabia regime severed 
ties with Qatar in June 2017.17  
Islamism: Qatar’s Bulwark to Saudi Wahhabism? 
                                                          
14 Baskan, Birol and Wright, , “Seeds of Change”, p. 99. 
15 No Author, “The Descendants of Saudi Wahhabism Founder Distance Themselves From Qatar”, Reuters (May 28, 2017), 
Qatarttps://www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar-idUSL8N1IU0AH. 
16 Baskan, Birol and Wright, , “Seeds of Change”, p. 96. 
17 No Author, “The Descendants of Saudi Wahhabism”, Reuters.  
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The Qatari regime addressed the absence of an indigenous class of the Saudi-styled 
Ulema through developing relations with prominent foreign scholars, creating a system 
where power is fully controlled especially as those non-Qatari scholars would be always “re-
liant on the state not only for employment but also to remain in the country.”18 One of 
these scholars is Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a senior idealogue of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Qa-
tari officials directly frame al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian but naturalised in Qatar, as a bulwark to 
Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi scholars. Indeed, the former Qatari justice minister and prominent 
lawyer Najeeb al Nauimi argued that “Saudi Arabia has Mecca and Medina. We have al-
Qaradawi”.19  
Much like his counterparts in Saudi Arabia, al-Qaradawi advocated a staunchly anti-
Shi’a position. In 2013, he issued a fatwa calling on “every Sunni Muslim with any military 
training to go and fight Shiites and Alawites in Syria”. He also declared that Alawites _ the 
branch of Shia Islam followed by the Assad regime _ were even “more infidel” than Jews.20 
Yet where Saudi and Qatari clerics have historically differed concerns Sunni Islamist move-
ments. While Qatar has long possessed positive relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Hamas, for elites in Saudi Arabia, the Islamist groups with a political focus – defined broadly 
– are viewed as a serious threat to the Al Saud. Qatari support for such groups was then 
taken as a serious challenge to Saudi Arabia’s vision of regional order.  
Qatar’s sponsorship of the Muslim Brotherhood goes beyond al-Qaradawi as evi-
denced in the Arab Uprisings unfolding in the region in 2011. In Egypt, during the presidency 
of Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammad Morsi in 2012-213, Qatar provided financial 
                                                          
18 Freer, Courtney, “Mapping Religious Authority in Wahhabi States”, p. 4 
19 Quoted by Dorsey, James M. "Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia," https://ssrn.com/abstract=2305485. 
(July  2013). 




aid in the region of $7.5 billion. After the coup that led to the removal of Morsi in Egypt in 
2013, and which was supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE and opposed by Qatar, Doha 
continued to support the Brotherhood.21 The Washington Post reported in November 2013 
that a Muslim Brotherhood leadership in exile “starting to take shape here among the 
shimmering high-rises of Doha.”22 The support also includes media as Aljazeera provided a 
platform and accommodation for several Brotherhood exiles. As one journalist observed, “it 
is in those suites and hotel lobbies that the future of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and, more 
broadly, the strategy and ideology of political Islam in the country may well be charted.”23 
Saudi Arabia scrutinized this support and moved into the other side such as provide around 
$8 billion in aid to his successor Abdel Fatah Al Sisi.24 
In Syria, the earlier years of the conflict witnessed what could be a coordinated divi-
sion between a Qatari sphere of influence on the northern border with Turkey and a Saudi 
sphere on the southern, Jordanian border.25 The coordination was short lived as Qatar ex-
pressed its support to Islamist leaders among Syrian political opposition in exile, to the cha-
grin of the Saudi Arabia. In Mid-March 2013, Riyadh was angered by the appointment by the 
opposition in mid-March of Ghassan Hitto as the exiles’ prime minister26. He was seen as 
Qatar’s Islamist candidate. In May of the same year, Qatar gave ground in the political field, 
accepting finally that the National Coalition should add a non-Islamist bloc backed by Saudi 
Arabia.27 These additions reflected a Saudi-led attempt to dilute the influence of the (Qatar-
backed) Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the council by broadening its member-
                                                          
21 No Author, “Egypt Returns $2 Billion to Qatar In Sign of Growing Tensions,” September 19, 2013, https://reut.rs/3ik0iBL.  




25 See Phillips,  Christopher, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2020).  





ship and composition28. On the ground, as Qatar supported Sunni Islamist militias that are 
avowedly opposed to the Saudi and Emirati regimes, tensions between Riyadh (and Abu 
Dhabi) and Doha escalated.29 
Central to this disagreement are competing visions of regional order and the role of 
Islamist movements within domestic and regional politics. For Saudi Arabia, it was con-
cerned that the fall of regimes such as Assad would result in Islamist regimes hostile to the 
Kingdom. As a source close to the Saudis recently declared, “The [Saudi] royal family looks 
at the Muslim Brotherhood as hands down the most serious threat to its existence. Its Shia 
minority doesn’t come even close”30.  
For the Saudis, the rise of Islamist movements created opportunities for Doha to 
carve out an independent role for itself through different alliances and cultivating separate 
relations with Sunni political Islamists.31 Saudi Arabia’s desire for regional leadership based 
on its claims to Islamic legitimacy is thus threatened with any potential Qatar-Muslim 
Brotherhood alliance. In the words of Kristian Ulrichsen, Qatar would have two forms of lev-
erage in states in transition following the Arab Uprisings “individual connections through the 
Doha-based exiles who returned to their countries of origin, and institutional influence as 
the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as a powerful player in the post-2011 environment.”32 
Ultimately, relations between Qatar and Islamist movements posed a serious challenge to 
the Saudi (and monarchical) led ordering of regional politics, particularly evident in the so-
cial capital exerted by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.33 
                                                          
28 Ulrichsen,  Kristian C. “Qatar and the Arab Spring” 
29 Khatib, Line, “Syria, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Qatar: The ‘Sectarianization’ of the Syrian Conflict and Undermining of Democratiza-
tion in The region,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (46:3), 385_403 (398). 
30 Baer, Robert, “Why Saudi Arabia is Helping Crush the Muslim Brotherhood”, New Republic, 26 August 2013, 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114468/why-saudi-arabia-helping-crush-muslim-brotherhood. 
31 Khatib, Line, “Syria, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E”, p.397.  
32Ulrichsen,  Kristian C. “Qatar and the Arab Spring” 
33 Baer, Robert, “Why Saudi Arabia is Helping” 
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The (Rogue) Iran Factor  
The spectre of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to loom 
large over regional developments in the Gulf, including tensions between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar. Since the revolution of 1979, political instability across the Gulf has routinely been 
framed as a consequence of nefarious Iranian interference, perhaps most obviously seen in 
Bahrain during the early 1980s which created conditions for the ongoing securitization – and 
later sectarianization – of life in the Gulf. One consequence of this is the rather crude con-
struction of a line drawn between a collection of Arab Sunni states, and Iran and Shi’a com-
munities. Typically the smaller Gulf states, including Qatar and those with Shi’a communi-
ties, sided with Saudi Arabia, most obviously seen in the establishment of the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council.  
Yet the GCC itself was not without tensions, particularly evident in fears about Saudi 
power over the organisation. As relations between Doha and Riyadh deteriorated, the abil-
ity to discursively construct the existence of nefarious relations between Qatar and Iran – 
states who share the world’s largest natural gas field - provided an easy means through 
which to exclude Qatar. Beyond Saudi actions, Bahrain also shifted its framing of the Arab 
Uprisings from a consequence of perfidious Iranian manipulation to a consequence of perni-
cious Qatari manipulation.34 The ensuing thaw in Qatari-Iranian relations came amidst Do-
ha’s efforts to secure autonomy and security beyond Saudi Arabia. For example, the 2017-
2020 tension with Saudi Arabia pushed Doha towards what some called a “temporary mar-
riage of convenience” as part of its mechanisms of deterrence that included more economic 
                                                          
34 See Mabon, Simon, Houses Built On Sand: Sovereignty, Violence and Revolution in the Middle East (Manchester:Manchester University 
Press, 2020), p.53; and Afzal, Muhammed, “The Qatar Blockade Is Over, But Tensions With Bahrain Are Not,” January 31, 2021, 
Associated Press, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/qatar-bahrain-blockade-ends-tensions-remain  
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and diplomatic relations.35 As a sign of their developing ties, Qatar restored its ambassador 
to Iran in 2017. This move came after initially recalling him in 2016 in solidarity with Saudi 
Arabia whose embassy in Tehran was attacked after the execution of the Shi’a cleric Sheikh 
Nimr al Nimr who was found guilty of acts of sedition.  
Intra-Sunni Sectarianization 
Understanding sectarianism as a process of exclusion and of boundary allows for a 
more nuanced reading of relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. From this approach it 
becomes apparent that both have sought to (re)draw boundaries to create lines of exclusion 
and differentiation for both domestic and regional audiences, allowing Riyadh and Doha to 
exert influence – political, material, and ideational – across the region. Fundamentally, the 
rivalry is a process of boundary making and closing off, differentiating between different ac-
tors on the grounds of competing visions of regional order. In the case of Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar, this closing off process took on existential importance as it related to foreign policy 
goals – most notably in Syria and Egypt – but also to domestic questions of legitimacy and 
survival.36 Within this closing off, identities feature in the sectarianization process as they 
“are mobilized by actors seeking to propagate particular agendas.”37 The Saudi-Qatari rivalry 
is emblematic of this, with both Riyadh and Doha seeking to shape regional politics in ac-
cordance with their own visions of order. 
Processes of exclusion and boundary making are evident in rhetoric from political, 
religious, social and economic elites. The sectarian component features heavily in much of 
this, evident in fatwas from leading Wahhabi figures in both states. For example, the Wah-
                                                          
35 No Author, “Iran-Qatar Trade Volume at $500 M”, Fars News Agency, June 29, 2015, 
http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940507001180 . 
36 Mabon, Simon, Houses Built on Sand, p. 34 & p. 103.  
37 Mabon, Simon, “Desectarianization: Looking Beyond the Sectarianization of Middle Eastern Politics,” The Review of Faith & 
International Affairs, (17:4, 2019) 23_35 (p. 24). 
11 
 
habi Qatari judge Anwar al-Badawi, considered the “most trusted” religious authority in Qa-
tar, issued a fatwa in 2017 charging that the blockade against his country by Saudi Arabia 
and three other countries went against the Qura’an and violated Sunnah (the sayings of 
Prophet Muhmmad)38. The fatwa was a response to another by Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti 
Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh, in which the latter declared that the blockade was to the 
“benefit the Muslims and benefit the future of the Qataris themselves as well”.39  
Yet such language is also prevalent across media coverage of developments and the 
discursive framing of the other. One dominant theme in Qatari media discourse is that Saudi 
Arabia re-others its relations with states at the expense of its ties with Qatar. While “Riyadh 
insists on antagonizing and besieging its neighbour and sister Qatar .. it adopts the rights of 
the Jews and pushes forward the ‘Jews First’ attitude,40” reads one article in a Qatari news-
paper. The pattern continued across the years of the rift, with the same Qatari newspaper 
claiming or quoting others as stating that Riyadh and Tel Aviv are getting closer as they 
share “similar interests.”41 Part of these interests include “selling highly sophisticated ma-
chines by Mossad [The Israeli intelligence] to help the Saudi regime spy on opponents of 
Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Ben Salman”42.  
Qatari newspapers even adopted the same anti-Shia rhetoric which Wahhabism is 
notoriously known for. The al-Sharq newspaper called it “intriguing and contradictory’ that 
‘Riyadh closes the doors in the face of Qatar, a sister state, and gets closer to Iran”.43 On the 
                                                          
38  Benallouch, Chaymaa, “Qatar’s Scholar Challenges Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti’s Stance on Gulf Crisis,” Morocco World News, June 
19, 2017, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/06/220358/qatar-saudi-arabia-grand-muftis-gulf-crisis 
39 Ibid. 
40 No author, “Qitar al-tatbei al-Saudi-al-Israeli yamdi bi-re’yat al-munazama [The Saudi-Israeli normalization train goes on with an 
organized sponsorship], al-Sharq, May 10, 2018, p. 36.  
41 No author, “Khabeer amni Israeli: al-Mossad yataawan ma Abu Dhabi wal Manama [an Israeli security expert: Mossad cooperates with 
Abu Dhabi and Manama], al-Sharq, July 10, 2017, p. 26 
42 No author, Tel Aviv zawadat al-Saudia bi-agheza mutatawera li-ta’qub muaarediha [Tel Aviv provided Saudi Arabia with sophisticated 
machines to trace its opponents], al-Sharq, 24 December, 2018. 
43 No author, al-Riyadh tughliq al-abwab fi wagh al-Doha wa taftaha amama Tehran [Riyadh Closes Doors In the face of Doha and opens it 
for Tehran], al-Sharq, August 14, 2017, p. 38 
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opposite, Saudi newspapers of “breaking away from the Arab Gulf consensus” by building 
“solid and strong relations with Israel”, adopting “Satanic diplomatic plans to befriend eve-
ryone in order to increase its regional status and influence”.44 Accusations were also made 
against Qatar and Israel for financing the Renaissance Ethiopian Dam threatening the access 
of Egypt, another country which allied with Saudi Arabia in its dispute, to its share of the 
River Nile’s waters.45 In other words, both Saudi and Qatari newspapers have drawn on 
similar tenets of Wahhabism, i.e. the ones appertaining to antagonistic relations with cate-
gories such as Jews or Israel as well as Shia or Iran, in order to deliberately re-draw the 
boundaries between them and all associated meanings of othering.  
Conclusion 
This politically charged intra-Sunni rivalry has wide ranging repercussions for regional 
politics. While initially viewed as a rivalry over the role of Iran in regional politics, the rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar is perhaps better understood as a consequence of compet-
ing visions of regional order and the role of Islam within political life. Intra-Sunni sectarian-
ism can take on antagonistic forms, based on the exploitation of particular communities im-
bued with meaning shaped by local context. Such developments have allowed Riyadh and 
Doha to cultivate relations with a range of groups across the region, using material and idea-
tional resources in pursuit of this goal.  
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